Beyond the Mimetic Principle

Kant With Lacan

In light of a new interest in the mimetic in contemporary art and philosophy of art, it is useful to remind oneself that this interest is not so new at all; that in fact it is a problem that has been haunting modern aesthetics since its very beginnings. Think of Roger Caillois’ writings on mimesis, Walter Benjamin’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s concepts of mimesis, Erich Auerbach’s *Mimesis*, Jacques Derrida’s “Economimesis”—to name but a few. Likewise, an engagement with the mimetic can be found in many artistic practices, of which Pop Art, Appropriation Art, the artistic strategies of fake, camouflage and re-enactment are only the most obvious of recent date.

In arguing that the mimetic has been haunting modern aesthetics, ‘haunting’ should be understood literally. In modernity’s relation to the mimetic there is something unresolved. Since its beginnings it has imposed itself on modern thought, as either something to overcome or something to achieve, as something dangerous or something useful, as an obstacle or a means. As such, the mimetic in modernity presents a truly dialectical problem. Hence, modern art’s attempt to do away with the mimetic and the emphasis on the mimetic of its postmodern counterpart appear as two sides of the same coin. These two sides are connected through their relation to something at the core of the mimetic that resists, something that resists its negation as much as it resists its full realization. One could never get entirely rid of the mimetic, as much as one could never fully accomplish it.

This seemingly paradoxical structure of the mimetic in modern art and aesthetics is linked to the problem of modern subjectivity. Historically, attempts to do away with the mimetic went hand in hand with an affirmation of the subject as the source of objectivity—e.g. the Kantian project to ground knowledge, morals and judgments of taste in the subject. And vice versa, reaffirmations of the mimetic accompanied efforts of the disempowerment of the subject as a firm ground of objectivity (one example in the field of aesthetics is Roland Barthes’ famous *The Death of the Author*). But structurally, as psychoanalysis has shown, the subject does not constitute itself in relation to a non-mimetic, allegedly substantial, authentic ker-
nel, and neither is it just the mere effect of a mimesis to the existent. Rather the subject escapes the mimetic, while at the same time forever failing to arrive at some non-mimetic core. It continues to be marked by the dialectical tension between a mimetic and a non-mimetic side. It is this tension that I want to explore in the following.

For this purpose, I want to propose going back to the beginnings of the modern aesthetics of mimesis, namely, to Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. I will first outline the late 18th century discourses on imitation and genius that influenced Kant’s aesthetics, secondly elaborate on Kant’s concept of exemplary originality and thirdly subject his discourse on art to a Lacanian critique.

In Kant’s third critique, more precisely in the second half of the *Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments*, which is dedicated to art, we can find a contradictory tension between the mimetic on the one side and a non-mimetic moment on the other side. Derrida, in his essay “Economimesis” recognizes this tension for the first time and develops from it a deconstructionist critique of Kant’s discourse on art. All of Kant’s non-mimetic differentiations—between art and the arts, art and nature, art and science, art and crafts—which lead up to the concept of genius, are finally and again, Derrida argues, being undermined. Kant ascribes to the dictate of nature that which, in the production of art, is its freest moment. The place of this dictate, according to Derrida, is the figure of genius, as the medium through which art receives its rules from nature. The genius doesn’t mimetically imitate nature, rather nature, by giving art its rules through the genius, folds back onto itself, returns to itself, reflects itself through art.1 For Derrida, the Kantian *as if*, which differentiates between nature and art, introduces an analogical mimesis at precisely that point at which art seems to be at the greatest distance to nature. Beautiful works of art must have the appearance of products of nature insofar as they are products of freedom. They have to appear to be effects of natural processes, yet in precisely that moment in which they are purely works of human artistic production. Mimesis here, for Derrida, does not designate a representation of a thing by another, not a relation of resemblance or identification of two things, not a reproduction of a product of nature through a product of art, in fact it does not define a relation between two products at all. Instead mimesis for him is the relation between two productions—and between two freedoms to produce, namely divine freedom and human freedom.2 This, for Derrida, is the kernel of the anthropo-theological mimesis implied in Kant’s conception of artistic production, the identification of one freedom with another, of a human act with a divine act.

Following Derrida’s deconstructionist critique of Kant’s discourse on art, I want to suggest conceiving of the tension between the mimetic and the non-mimetic as a central aspect of the modern (aesthetic) subject, which, with Lacan, should be understood in recourse to the relation between the symbolic and the real. Such a Lacanian reading will not, like in Derrida, lead us to uncover a hidden and unacknowledged mimesis in Kant’s seemingly non-mimetic aesthetics. Rather, it allows
us to think the tension between the mimetic and the non-mimetic in Kant as at the same time irreconcilable and constitutive for the aesthetic subject.

To start with, I will outline the historical philosophical sources of Kant’s concepts of imitation and of genius. Strikingly, the contradiction between the mimetic and the non-mimetic already structured the historical constellation out of which Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment and more precisely out of which his discourse on art emerged. The empirical psychology of the late 18th century heavily relied on imitation as a natural behavioral disposition. If the mimetic has always been situated between nature and culture it might not be by coincidence that imitation was then widely referred to as a drive, the notorious Nachahmungstrieb—a concept that Freud later in Beyond the Pleasure Principle discards in favor of Wiederholungszwang. Despite many disagreements concerning its location in the human mind, the mimetic drive was at that time seen as an anthropological constant through which one learns to model one’s own behavior after that of the other’s. The most common philosophical source for this was Aristotle’s Poetics where he famously argues: “For it is an instinct of human beings, from childhood, to engage in mimesis (indeed, this distinguishes them from other animals: man is the most mimetic of all, and it is through mimesis that he develops his earliest understanding); and equally natural that everyone enjoys mimetic objects.” A number of poetic works from the Weimar classicism express this belief vividly. Consider, for instance, Goethe in his poem Playing at Priests: “As children, monkeys, and mankind/ To ape each other are inclin’d”; or Schiller in his mourning play The Death of Wallenstein: “For man was made an imitating creature,/ And who goes first will always lead the flock.” The psychology of the late 18th century, however, understood mimesis not only as one of the most natural human drives, but also as one of the most fruitful and most dangerous at the same time. On the one side the mimetic drive could create genuine sympathy and empathy, but on the other side it could lead to a mere aping (Nachähfen) of the other’s behavior because one is jealous, wants to be liked or tries to gain advantages for him- or herself.

The dialectical counterpart of the empirical psychology of the late 18th century with its concept of mimesis or Nachahmung is the artistic movement of Sturm und Drang with its concept of genius. With their aesthetics of original creation its adepts believed to finally have freed themselves from the paradigm of the mimetic imitation of nature through art, which had been, more or less, valid from the Renaissance until the mid-18th century. Here we find one of the first instances of this grand narrative, which Mladen Dolar in another context describes as the “foundational myth of modernity that there once was a mimetic art and then modernity finally did away with it, liberating humanity from the mimetic fetters, this is what defines modernity at its core.” The young artists and philosophers of Sturm und Drang worshipped the genius as the creative gift of an artist but also as a divine spark residing in these exceptional individuals. Genius was seen as the natural and un-learnable disposition of feeling in the subject as ground for artistic creation. Allegedly, artistic creation resided in the most inner part of the soul of the subject. The Sturm und
Drang elevated the genius in a radical emancipation from philosophy, science and the system of the arts to the image of an original, unconditioned, undetermined subjectivity. Its original creativity was celebrated in analogy to the godly creation of the world, making the genius a godlike creator of an original aesthetic world, a Schöpfer who out of himself creates a totality. Especially inspired by the works of Shakespeare, Herder and Goethe praised the genius as a Prometheus-like creator, as free from all laws of time and space, a divine messenger, translator of nature, interpreter of all languages of all ages, voice of god, and so on—interestingly they frequently employed metaphors for a harmony between being and language, for a kind of meta-language. Again, and perhaps not by chance, the concept of drive here reappears. In his aesthetics Calligone, which was published in 1800 and directed against Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, Herder calls the enthusiasm of the genius, which was given to him by a higher power, the “holy drive” (heiliger Trieb) that drives the genius to create inimitable, original works. Thanks to his exceptional abilities and his immediate relation to god the genius was believed to have the power to undo social and political alienation and aesthetically unite what was separated in one harmonious totality.

As one might expect, Kant was more than skeptical towards the mystic ideology of Sturm and Drang, to say the least—and not only because Herder, while having been his student, turned out to be his philosophical archenemy. Nonetheless, Kant’s aesthetics is deeply rooted in both of these discourses. He had great interest in the empirical psychology of the 1770s and used its concept of the human mimetic faculty (which he mainly took from J. N. Tetens und J. Feder). In his Lectures on Logic, for example, Kant argues for the great significance of imitation for learning and in the sciences. At the same time, however, already in the early 1770s and in opposition to his contemporaries Gottsched, Batteaux, Lessing and others as well as to the aesthetic theory of the 18th century in general, Kant rejected the principle of imitatio naturae as the fundamental principle of art. Instead, inspired by J. G. Hamann and E. Young, he turned towards the concept of genius as a spontaneous invention of the spirit, free from given laws. After that Kant at least twice changed his notion of the relation between imitation and genius again, first under the influence of the empirical psychology of J. J. Winckelmann and J. N. Tetens and again in the context of his own Lectures on Ethics and the Critique of Pure Reason.

Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is, as Cassirer rightly states, located “at the crossroads of all aesthetic discussions in the eighteenth century.” Two of the most important roads of these were, as mentioned, the neo-classical doctrine of mimetic imitation and the romantic emphasis on free, non-mimetic creativity. But Kant does not play off one against the other nor does he discard one in favor of the other. Instead he tries to combine them or put them into relation with each other.

In the third critique, this culminates in Kant’s seemingly paradoxical concept of exemplary originality as the definition of ingenious works of art. Contrary to other interpretations I want to argue that exemplarity and originality have to be understood as two dimensions of the aesthetic subject that relate to each other in a con-
Contrary tension. To delegate them to two separate agents, or to conciliate them with each other, would be to lose the most interesting and vital tension within Kant’s conception of the aesthetic subject.

Exemplarity first of all is introduced as a normative, regulative function in relation to originality. Kant argues that “since there can also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e., exemplary.”¹⁴ The products of genius are not themselves imitations, but they have to be able to be imitated by others; they themselves don’t follow a model, but they have to be able to serve others as a model; they don’t adhere to any given rule, but others have to be able to extract a rule from them. In order to lay out in which ways the products of genius can be exemplary for others Kant develops a complex typology of forms of imitation. Imitation as Nachäffung can be understood as a mere reproduction or a superficial mannerism, which even corrects the original in certain moments but without relating these corrections to the idea of the original. Kant differentiates Nachäffung from Nachahmung: a notion of imitation by other artists or artistic schools that develop a dogmatism out of a set of rules that they extracted from exemplary works of art, i.e., “a methodical instruction in accordance with rules, insofar as it has been possible to extract them from those products of spirit and their individuality.”¹⁵ From this perspective, the history of art would appear as a homogenous continuity of aesthetic reactions, a great accumulation of academic and mannerist imitations, an endless repetition of the same—were it not for the products of genius as a break in this continuity. But the genius too is subject to a form of imitation, namely imitation as Nachfolge, as an “emulation by another genius, who is thereby awakened to the feeling of his own originality, to exercise freedom from coercion in his art in such a way that the latter thereby itself acquires a new rule, by which the talent shows itself as exemplary.”¹⁷ Nachfolge is not a form of imitation in the strict sense, not the imitation of a work of art, not the repetition of a set of rules extracted from another work of art, but the paradoxical figure of an imitation of freedom in production which is itself an act of freedom. Here, in comparison to the other two forms of imitation, there is a very different relation at stake. Nachäffung and Nachahmung on the one hand are concerned with the relation between the products of genius and its imitators. The concept of imitation as Nachfolge on the other hand tries to conceive of the relation between two geniuses, or a product of genius and another genius. As a truly free act in the Kantian sense can’t be mimetically determined by the act of another, one would have to understand Nachfolge as a relation in which both actions solely relate to each other by the fact that they are both free—not in the sense that the freedom of one has its condition in the other. Furthermore, this relation of Nachfolge can’t be intended or known by the acting subject itself. One could even argue that Nachfolge—and the literal meaning of the German term would support this—is a retroactive effect more than anything else: There only ever will have been ingenious works of art. Understood in this way, imitation as Nachfolge does not, like the other forms of imitation, fall under the concept of the exemplarity of genius in the strict sense.
But contrary to the genius’ freedom from rules, scholastic instruction is a necessary condition for its exemplarity, as Kant underlines. Kant here follows up on his distinctions between work and art, and between mechanical and aesthetic art from his definition of beautiful art in §43.

Although mechanical and beautiful art, the first as a mere art of diligence and learning, the second as that of genius, are very different from each other, still there is no beautiful art in which something mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rules, and thus something *academically correct*, does not constitute the essential condition of the art.  

Artistic production presupposes thought, more precisely a thought end, in order to be able to count as art. Otherwise, according to Kant, it would merely be a product of chance. But in order to realize an end in a work determinate rules are necessary. The artist must learn and submit himself to the rules of art. Even though, as Kant continuously points out, “genius is entirely opposed to the *spirit of imitation,*” the production of art has a whole series of forms of imitation as its condition. Contrary to the mystic concept of original creativity of *Sturm und Drang*, the production of a work of art for Kant is very much dependent on the symbolic order of artistic traditions, schools, styles, rules, technics and a community of taste.

Opposed to these forms of mimetic relations, originality is the “primary characteristic” of genius. Kant initially defines it as “a *talent* for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given.” But as no product can be called art without a given rule, it is, Kant argues, the “*nature in the subject*” that gives art its rule. And here lies Kant’s difficulty in defining the moment of originality: it can firstly only be defined in negation to that which it is not, and secondly only in relation to its products. Kant states of genius “that it cannot itself describe or indicate scientifically how it brings its product into being, but rather that it gives the rule as *nature*.23 Genius is, in relation to its originality, characterized by a non-knowledge. The aesthetic subject does not know how it arrived at the ideas that are expressed in its product; it is not in its power to consciously intend such a production according to a plan; and it can’t teach others how to bring about such a product. If genius is that “predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which *nature* gives the rule to art” then originality can be understood as that moment in which genius exceeds the existing rules of art and at the same time gives art a new rule. But the latter, as Kant emphasizes, “must be abstracted from the deed, i.e. from the product.” That means, one can’t predict a production of originality but grasps something as being original retrospectively through judging again and again, particular works of art.

If one reads the corresponding passages in §46 to §49 of the third critique attentively, it becomes obvious that Kant indeed seems to have problems in determining the relations between exemplarity and originality. On the one hand, art presupposes determinate rules in order to be called art. On the other hand however, art, in its judgment as well as its production, can’t be determined by concepts or rules. Beautiful art requires artistic rules. But at the same time the products of genius
don’t succumb to these rules but exceed them. Genius is opposed to imitation, but nonetheless there is no genius without imitation. The production of original works of art is not determined by any positively given rule and still it must create a new, previously not existing rule.

The whole question of artistic production revolves around this impossible moment: creating something according to a rule that is not given. Art, it seems, is a lost cause—in the double meaning that it seems impossible to produce a work of art under these conditions, but that this impossibility is at the same time the condition of the production of art. Adorno calls this the paradox of the tour de force in Beethoven’s work and moreover of the aesthetic as such: ”that out of nothing something develops, the aesthetically incarnate test of the first steps of Hegel’s logic.” Kant’s whole discourse on art writes itself in relation to this paradox. And it’s remarkable with how much theoretical rigor and inventiveness Kant tries to conceptualize this by definition un-conceptualizable moment, in how many different disguises this impossible place of foundation returns in Kant’s discourse: in his dictum that art has to appear as if it was nature (§45); in the free harmony between the faculties of imagination and reason (§49/50); in his attempts to find a solution to the antinomy of taste by introducing the indeterminate concept of the supersensible (Dialectics of aesthetic judgment, §57) and even by recurring to the thing in itself (Remark II). And yet, this place beyond the mimetic, beyond the symbolic order of taste can, from the standpoint of the conceptual framework of reason, only be addressed negatively. Beyond that, there is no firm ground from where to grasp it, it always again slips away. No concept of reason is sufficient, no transcendental argumentation abundant.

Furthermore, Kant struggles to keep those uncanny figures at bay that lurk around this impossible place. Artistic production is always in threat of producing nonsense and madness—not as a threat from the outside but as a threat immanent to itself. The productive imagination is always in danger of subverting the laws of taste and producing non-sense or indulging itself in a flight of enthusiasm. Nonsense and madness are figures of a too-much, of an excess of imagination. Kant therefore—in opposition to the concept of genius in Sturm und Drang—insists that originality alone is not enough. The production of an ingenious work of art requires technique, skill, discipline and rules. But in the end, there’s no guarantee. Nonsense seems an inevitable surplus of artistic production.

As argued, before the antinomy between exemplarity and originality should not be dissolved by delegating them to separate agents or by reconciling them in a superficial way. Instead, the tension between imitation and genius, between exemplarity and originality should be understood as constitutive for the aesthetic subject. And this tension can be connected to the Lacanian relation between the symbolic and the real. One could argue that what has been called a moment of the non-mimetic is not something merely opposed to imitation, but rather something that stands in relation to—paraphrasing Freud here—a beyond the mimetic principle.
If Kant’s discourse in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is indeed situated \textit{inside} the aesthetic subject, then one of the conditions of artistic production is that the aesthetic subject submits itself to the existing rules of art, to what one could call the symbolic order of taste. The latter consists of a community of taste, artistic traditions and schools, techniques that have to be learned, styles, conventions and motifs. The aesthetic subject, internalizing these rules of art, imposes the symbolic law of taste upon itself from the inside. This law rejects non-sense, reverie and mad enthusiasm as pathological products of the productive imagination. It governs aesthetic production on a field marked by the distinction between sense and non-sense.

But as much as the subject imposes the symbolic law of taste upon itself from the inside, it remains heteronomous. Just like art, for Kant, has to be differentiated from nature, from science, from craft, from mere liking, from moral feeling, from knowledge, likewise it has to be differentiated from mere imitation and from the mere application of certain, given rules. But this separation from everything, in the Kantian sense, pathological to aesthetic production produces an un-assimilable rest, and it is this rest that is at the same time its true driving force. It is this point beyond the mimetic principle, beyond the distinction between sense and non-sense that aesthetic production is oriented towards.

Unlike the first and second critiques, Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment* and his discourse on art theoretically invests in this impossible place. Ultimately, it is not the symbolic law of taste that drives aesthetic production but its orientation towards that which is situated beyond it. If Kant’s reflections futilely evolve around this point which itself can’t be known, then the figure of genius is located exactly at this place. It inhabits a stand-in function for that which can’t be integrated as a positive condition of aesthetic production, but still determines it from the inside. For Kant, in other words, the genius is the locus of art as a lost cause: of the impossibility of producing a work of art derived from predetermined conditions, and of precisely this impossibility as condition of art’s production.

In his *Seminar VII* Lacan calls that which is situated beyond the pleasure principle—beyond the symbolic order—the Thing (\textit{das Ding}) and later the real. The Thing must be posited as excluded from the symbolic law, as something external, which the subject experiences as foreign. And yet it constitutes the most intimate interior of the subject, that whereof the fate of the subject, the way of its desire is oriented. It functions as the vanishing point of desire and is at the same time inaccessible, originally lost. It’s here, one could argue, in the irreconcilable tension between the symbolic order of taste and the real of genius beyond the mimetic principle that the impossibility of an autonomous, self-transparent subject becomes apparent. Subjection always depends on something excluded, a kernel of the real that remains, insists and disturbs the self-construction from the inside. There remains a rest that can’t be assimilated.
Kant’s figure of genius is a stand-in for this excluded something in the innermost of the subject, for the real in the symbolic. And for Kant the striving towards this beyond the symbolic is the true driving force of aesthetic production—but opposed to the cult of Sturm and Drang for which the genius functions as the phantasm of a godlike creator, aiming at the aesthetic undoing of alienation, the creation of a harmonious totality, a unified whole. The products of Kant’s genius do not unify or make whole, they don’t have any totalizing function. They emerge from this gap in the symbolic and interrupt established conventions and the continuity of the rules of art. They mark a break in the symbolic conditions of art—a break with meaning and with the continuity of things.

But if Kant argues that the products of genius are attempts of aesthetically presenting the unrepresentable, then we have to remind ourselves with Lacan, that in the end the real resists representation. What one gets with the attempt of representing the real is never the real as such. There always remains a rest. Likewise the products of genius must remain inadequate. Kant—in his theoretical rigor and in opposition to Sturm und Drang—acknowledges this inadequacy and impossibility of any representation of the real by emphasizing that a product of genius is a "representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible." Works of art are necessarily inadequate attempts of sensually presenting what lies beyond the limits of experience. They occasion much thinking, as Kant puts it, because they lack determinate concepts.

The strength of Kant’s discourse on art ultimately lies in his refusal to resolve the tension between the symbolic and the real, allowing the concept of genius to function as a placeholder for the real in the symbolic. We should not understand Kant’s concept of genius as some kind of mystic entity of higher, godlike powers to reconcile body and soul, nature and freedom, being and sense—but instead as a placeholder for that from where such a reconciliation is impossible, a placeholder for a gap in the structure that resists signification. Genius marks the inner border of the allegedly self-transparent subject. It is the figure of an origin that itself can’t be grounded, can’t be conceptualized or known—it is a figure of a lost cause. As such a figure of paradox, of something excluded in the interior of the subject, it introduces a break in the symbolic conditions of the production of art. Without final synthesis, without final harmony, the Kantian genius realizes a break with meaning and the order of taste.

To conclude, I would like to briefly return to the problem of the mimetic. What do we find in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, more precisely in his discourse on art? Arguably, Kant offers us a way to acknowledge the mimetic and the non-mimetic as two dimensions of the modern aesthetic subject, related to each other in a dialectical tension. On the one side, he rejects the neo-classical dogma of mimetic imitation as primary condition of artistic production. But on the other side, he also rejects the modern myth of a non-mimetic, unconditioned subject of creation as
sole condition of art. Instead, he tries to think them together as constitutive of the aesthetic subject. Kant’s concept of genius does not describe an exceptional, artistic personality, not a divine gift, not the ability to aesthetically reconcile what has been shattered. It marks the place of a break in the symbolic, where something does not add up, does not function smoothly according to plan. With Kant the genius marks the locus of a radical non-knowledge, which is to say, the site of an encounter with the real. It is this dialectic between the mimetic and the non-mimetic, the “specter of mimesis” that has been haunting the modern aesthetic discourse since its beginnings. That would apply, very schematically, to modern art as an attempt to do away with mimesis and represent the real, as well as to postmodern art as an affirmation of the mimetic, celebrating the death of the original in an endless series of copies for which there is no original. A Lacanian reading of Kant’s aesthetics offers us a way to address the mimetic and the non-mimetic as two related dimensions of the aesthetic subject. One can’t just do away with either of them. It’s only through mimesis that one can encounter what lies beyond the mimetic. But there’s no guarantee for success, no necessity. One can only ever try again and fail better “to make things of which we do not know what they are.”

Notes

2. Derrida, 9.
6. Already with the intellectual movement following the publication of Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750) art seemed to have finally, after 2000 years, emancipated itself from the domination of reason, its limitation to the imitation of nature and the application of technical rules. And it began to challenge philosophy and the rational sciences with its new claim to an aesthetic truth which is founded on sensual feeling.
11. The complicated system of conceptual differentiations between different forms of mimetic behavior (between Nachmachen, Nachahmen, Imitation, Nachtun and Nachäffen) shows the great theoretical effort that Kant put into this at that time.


13. Gammon, for example, emphasizes the contradiction between exemplarity and originality and tries to solve it by delegating each of the opposing terms to different agents, originality to the genius and exemplarity to the imitating other. See Martin Gammon, "Exemplary Originality. Kant on Genius and Imitation." Journal of the History of Philosophy 35.4 (1997):563-592. Guyer on the other side argues that there is no fundamental contradiction between originality and exemplarity and that it is the genius’ task to conciliate both demands with each other. See Paul Guyer, "Exemplary Originality. Genius, Universality, and Individuality;" The Creation of Art. New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics, ed. Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003) 116-137.


15. Kant §49, 196.


17. Kant, §49, 196/7.

18. Kant, §47, 188.


20. Kant, §46, 186.


22. Kant, 186.

23. Kant, 187.

24. Kant, 186.

25. Kant §47, 188.


27. Kant, §49, 192.
