The remembrance of Hume interrupted Kant’s dogmatic slumber, and inaugurated the period of reinvigorated speculative philosophy which would come to define the modern era. If we initially omit the scope of implications that followed, it seems that a simple dream of a philosophical figure was enough to form a new mode of thinking. However, Kant didn’t propose a grandiose undertaking of renewing the human spirit, as he argued in the context of the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, where he merely questioned the premise of the possibility of pure sciences. He based his reflections on an essentially theological assertion that men of his time are reconciled with belief that the established mode of knowing is undoubtedly true: the dogmatic presumption being that it is possible to make progress in pure knowledge by strictly following the realization of concepts without first putting forth a critique of reason itself. At least in the formal sense, Kant articulated a contrasting framework which rested on the exposition of conditions of possibility of knowledge or appearance. Yet interestingly the path that led him there seemed to be knitted out of material made of dreams. Where do the conditions of knowledge then meet with dreams? Such a premise can lead us to hypothesize that Kant dreamt of certain speculations on Hume, which led him to articulate an unconscious desire. Essentially, desires have to be reread as a tool for representation, a principle which conditions thought. It sounds Kantian enough to simply follow the inner tendency of dreams to a logical conclusion. In other words, it isn’t our purpose to justify Kant’s philosophy, but to outline if (and how) a dream is capable of instituting a comprehensive change in reason itself.

If the presented topic is in principle centered around dreams, any interpretation which is deprived of the pivotal insight that dreams are a wish fulfilment (*Wunschverfüllung*) can only be seen as a bastardization of Freud’s message. Even if a transpired dream is as clear as a recurrence of an ordinary daily experience, there is nevertheless something additional present in it, an unconscious shadow. The latter can be presented through a distortion in the exhibited appearance of the dream. It isn’t self-evident that this is the norm as there are undoubtedly instances where the latent and the manifested content overlap, whereby the unconscious desire is fully visible during waking life. However, even such cases don’t exclude the existence of an essential characteristic of the unconscious desire according to which we...
“must regard dreams as the guardians of sleep.”

Dreams articulate the incongruity imbedded in (unconscious) thoughts in such a manner that the dreamer can continue slumbering. We only wake up when the dream content touches reality (Wirklichkeit). This trait is further linked with a peculiar detail which is often unformulated but presupposed, namely, that a part of the dream persists as unanalyzable, but as such serves as the kernel of our being. These aren’t just specific instances according to which it is possible to recognize individual traits of a dreamer’s state, as they exist as a structural necessity. With this in mind, let us return to the subject matter.

In the same vein that Lacan reinterpreted Freud’s dream of Irma’s injection, we should also look at Kant’s supposed dream as a response to questions that occupied him throughout his life and accordingly approach dreams as though they were a sacred text, where "the author comes second, only as a pen-pusher." At first, it may seem that for Kant the problematic core of metaphysics rests in its dogmatism, but interestingly enough, he himself remarked, "science is only possible by being developed dogmatically and, in accordance with the strictest demands, systematically." If we are content to use the idea of dogma only as an authoritative principle pertaining to a certain community, then the dream wouldn’t need Hume’s intervention. However, following Hegel’s insight, dogma is immanent to the process of thought, or strictly said, the theoretical part of truth one is obliged to practice: an insistence on discipline and fidelity to the word. By constructing his dream in a way that would prolong his sleep, Kant dogmatically dreamt the same dream over and over again. He continued to repeat the dogma and followed it to an unbearable end, a failure to establish an a priori link between cause and effect (Hume). In the last instance, the catalyst for Kant’s awakening wasn’t a break with dogmatic thought, but a fidelity to dogma itself.

Before interpreting Kant’s revelation, let us be faithful to Freud’s remark that “no one can practice the interpretation of dreams as an isolated activity, as it remains a part of the work of analysis,” and firstly unfold the theoretical framework behind our endeavour. But in so doing, it would be more productive to firstly take into consideration a more modest dream, a dream that was dreamt by Hegel. He mentioned this dream as a marginal occurrence in a letter to a friend (niethammer), but it nevertheless made him restless to such an extent that he couldn’t help but recount it. By his own admission, verbalization of the dream seemed the only way to free himself of its subtle influence, even if in other instances he stated that “it is not worth the effort to retain or remember dreams.” Even though his life is well documented, this dream certainly presents a unique glimpse into his mind.

On the night of the 5th of January, 1814, Hegel dreamt that he “was in a large group attending a disputation in which two physiologists [...] discussed the relative merits of apes and pigs.” While the disputants argued about which are more human, apes or pigs,
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a loudmouthed, wide-bodied fellow named Pippel [People or Pöbel] [...] continually wanted to bring up still other matters, even juridical matters such as human rights, constitutions, and so forth. But the moderator, who, so to speak, played the role of fate throughout the whole proceeding, treated all matters of this sort as mere irrelevancies, mere packaging. He disallowed them from being seriously discussed, and held firm in his insistence that the issue was merely a preference between the two species. But a super-clever man, murmuring in the corner more to himself, then asked the moderator—this seemed to me unrelated—whether he meant that Pippel, should he someday feel warm in his heart and head, would, as is well known, risk the shirt off his back; that aristocrats would put this to their advantage; and that Pippel would thus play the fool in a game—as in fact occurs quite legally in the name of the Devil, and has always occurred from time immemorial. The historian Zschokke then ran up to jump in, shouting that the people of Bern had already received an answer at least verbally from Zurich, but that there were still many other considerations [...] and so forth.10

At that point Hegel woke up and it seemed difficult to him "to have to go to class and lecture on law."11 Even before describing the dream, Hegel makes an observation to his friend: "I now believe the entire dream stemmed from the fact that a medical student handed me your letter."12 A premature observation or interpretation suggests a similar inclination as a postmodern analysand confronted with a dream in one of his sessions: I don’t know what my dream means, however I’m positive that it has something to do with my mother. Yet, it is paramount to sustain this problem and not rush to solve it.

Hegel usually touches upon the phenomena of dreams only in passing and with an uncommon anxiousness. The most coherent account can be found in a transcript made by one of Hegel’s students. It is not a text which was published by Hegel himself, but a sort of a manuscript of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (1827-28), which was the basis for the formation of Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Its focus is principally on subjective spirit or as Hegel explains: "Here we consider only the finite spirit, but in it the essential substance is to be spirit. It has this in common with the infinite spirit, to be spirit."13 In it there is a clear throwback to Aristotle’s De Anima in which he similarly expounds that the organizing principle of the spirit is spirit itself, thus having itself for its own object. Furthermore, Hegel identifies "Know yourself" as the basic imperative of spirit, and regards the imperative as a condition of spirit’s achieving its vocation. Ultimately, it is self-knowledge that unifies the various faculties, powers, and/or functions of spirit. The spirit should not be considered as having an (pre)established being. It is rather:

This movement, this process, this activity of going out of nature and of liberating itself from nature [...] The nature of spirit is to be this absolute liveliness, to be this process itself, namely, of proceeding out of its natural origins and natural immediacy, to abandon and suspend these conditions and thus
to come to itself, to free itself. Spirit is only as it comes to itself, it exists only as it produces itself. Its actuality is only that it has made itself to be what it is.14

In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel offers a more accessible illustration: “spirit is the ethical life of a people insofar as it is the immediate truth; it is the individual who is a world. It must advance to a consciousness about what it immediately is, it must sublate (aufheben) that beautiful ethical life, and, by passing through a series of shapes, it must attain a knowledge of itself.”15 The narrative tells the story of spirit’s triumph over the external world. This triumphant march begins with the simplest organic life, proceeds to the opposition of spirit in the struggle for recognition and culminates in the emergence of free spirit, to wit, spirit for itself (*fursichsein*).

Although spirit is supposed to follow a path of concretization (by cultivating reality it is to become, the spirit establishes its own presuppositions) and thus liberate itself from nature, that does not exclude the possibility of degradation of the spirit. However, overcoming such instances of infirmity are paramount to the existence of spirit, as its structure is always susceptible to disintegration, such as dementia,16 which Hegel likens to the beautiful soul. In a manner that is similar to the way the beautiful soul substitutes acting for subjective fancies and ideals, the demented grasps at an ideal fantasy world, while simultaneously displacing the objective reality. Both forms of immediacy make the flight from the world into subjectivity their purpose. Hegel includes clairvoyance, hypnotism and magnetism in this category, and thus approximates his reading with the one offered by Freud on the omnipotence of thoughts (*Allmacht der Gedanken*).17

Hegel includes this topic of the inhibited spirit under the title dreaming soul. Hegel conceptualizes the dreaming soul as self-feeling, thought as a limited existence, a deficit, being devoid of the knowledge of its own contradiction. More specifically, the spirit at first appears estranged from itself and is thus reduced to a simple spirit, a concept of purpose (*Zweckbegriff*), but as a particular instance of spirit it is also a universal process of overcoming immediacy (individual cases determine the universal). While possessing the elementary form, spirit is a pre-conscious condition and some interpreters even find in it a Hegelian version of the unconsciousness,18 meanwhile Hegel himself has another motive in mind as he uses Aristotle’s passive *nous* to explain it. In essence, such spirit is slumbering. In this state, as an “immediate existence,” the spirit is the soul, or, “the soul is the Spirit in nature”; not yet spirit as spirit, for it belongs to spirit to negate and render ideal its immediacy, its being, its immersion in nature, and to make these its own. The soul itself is posited (as immediate) and it is posited by spirit itself. It is a play of spirit whereby it comes to itself. In this sense, the soul is the subject of sentience (*Empfindung*), it is sentient totality, a contingent totality of sentience, and as such “an existent concept, the existence of speculation” within an enclosed particular world.19 For Hegel, the soul fails to draw a distinction within itself. There is no outer limit. It is even “hostile towards the endurance of the outer world; it negates the world and makes it null.”20 Along these lines, it is possible to reason that the life of a soul mirrors the process
of sleep itself. Sleeping is namely not there to offer a safe haven for dreams, but
the other way around, dreams lay the foundation for souls to fall asleep. While the
purpose of daydreams is thus to shape sleep in broad daylight, sleep in the midst of
waking, insomnia expresses a state bereft of dreams.

If the soul is still sleeping, what exactly wakes her? It seems that desire is struc-
tured in such a way, that it avoids the state of wakefulness. Underlying this thought
is the more fundamental query regarding the factors that differentiate the slumber
of the soul at the moment it awakens? More bluntly put, what is hence the dif-
cference between the state of sleeping and waking? Even if at the first glance the
distinction seems as clear as the summer’s sun. Yet Hegel clearly didn’t think that
determining the two states was a straightforward matter. To substantiate his opin-
ion he mentioned that Napoleon addressed this exact question to a class of ideology
while visiting the University of Padua.23 Both considered it a captious problem that
does not seem solvable. Although differences may abound between the states of
wakefulness and sleep, the similarities are more relevant to the present discussion.

Not because of any personal preference, but because the requirements of the topic.
Insight into the realm of the similarity is significant for the comprehension of the
structure of knowledge itself. There are precedents of consigning the state of con-
sciousness to another topic. An example can already be found in Aristotle’s Parva
Naturalia, where he argued that the common core of sleep and waking can be found
in the perceptive faculty, but it was Descartes who made the deliberate step by ex-
plicitly claiming that the experience of a dream could in principle be indistinguish-
able from waking life: "For even thought I might be dreaming, if there is anything
which is evident to my intellect, then it is wholly true."24 Searching for certainty
something that is not subject to doubt, Descartes completely disregarded the thin
line between sleeping and waking and based truth on pure knowledge (cogito ergo
sum) that has nothing outside itself. In a sense, Pliny (the Younger) was right when
he said, quod dubitas, ne feceris, when in doubt, do nothing. There is thus sufficient
similarity present between experiences of sleeping and being awake to ingrain
doubt into our ability to distinguish them apart and/or causes us to mistake one for
the other. Doubt insists even if firm evidence of dissimilarity between both states
of consciousness is presented to the doubter. In not accepting the obvious, doubt
persists as a blind spot of reason, a deceiving demon that befuddles our knowledge,
the mirage of truth from which only lies can be expected.

How to overcome such an impasse to differentiate wakefulness from sleep that
otherwise may not even be considered as a deadlock? At first sight, there couldn’t
be a more clear answer. Our conscious perception of our surroundings necessi-
tates that we concern ourselves with images of the external world. However, the
same can be again postulated of sleep: dreams as images embedded into the state
of sleeping are clearly related to the mechanism of representation. Furthermore,
dreaming also parallels consciousness, since dreaming concerns itself with images
which are constituted by dream-work. In this sense, waking state and sleep seem
to share a similar logic: a manner of contemplating, which utilizes reason itself as
the object of reflection. In order to avoid further digressions, let us present Hegel’s solution. Although a simple observation would suffice, Hegel, for one, remains apprehensive regarding the function of dreams as it seems to stretch into the state of wakefulness.

While not undermining the features that link sleep and wakefulness, he introduces a general common sense distinction where the existence and confrontation with an external world is the sufficient reason to differentiate the two predicaments. This is furthermore substantiated by the premise that in sleep I am not for myself. Without having a coherent framework to hold together the complex of images in this state, “everything can run through one’s mind without connection, without purpose” and thus incapacitates the subject together with the totality of all determinations. We can all testify to the unpleasantness of going to bed intending to sleep and yet lying awake. The common remedy can be taken as a practical rule: one must stoically turn away one’s attention as soon as consciousness starts to perceive any thought stirring. In a similar discussion of his own, Kant purposes that a random neutral object, such as the figure of Cicero, can be of great help. The moment that ideas lose their coherency, awareness is suspended. Hegel used an example of Jean Paul, who used nonsensical, silly stories to put children to sleep, to demonstrate that the suppression of the power of consciousness can only lead to sleep. Bearing this in mind, it is easier to understand why Aristophanes and Agathon were put to sleep by Socrates before he could conclude his argument in the *Symposium*.

We can surmise that there is a rational framework holding together the weight of the representational forms of wakeful and dreaming consciousness, however an immanent question remains unanswered: how is consciousness related to its own structure? Hegel offers a simple solution. While in waking I relate myself to myself, in dreams I do not relate to myself as the concrete center. Hegel continuous: an “entire interconnected nexus is concretely present in me in a veiled way [...] and when something entirely unexpected appears to me, which does not fit into that complex, I can ask, am I awake or am I dreaming? When by and by I learn to comprehend this nexus, then I regard it [even the unexpected] as actual.” Whenever unsure of my concrete condition I can ask, am I awake or am I dreaming? Dreams simply suspend the inner differentiation of the consciousness to itself, which produces enjoyment. It is precisely because of this, that it is even more interesting to observe Hegel’s difficulties to grasp the concept of dreams, as it is precisely dreams where his logical exploration seems to stumble.

Hegel, similar to Descartes, applies a certain sceptical outlook to rationality itself. Descartes methodically examined the possibilities of certainty to such an extent that he excluded consciousness from its link with the world, and thereby inadvertently abolished the means by which one could declare a specific actuality. In contrast, Hegel made a slight readjustment of this endeavour. In a predicament where a plain thought is enough to bring about an existential dilemma of uncertainty, the subject is left with a forced choice, haunted by thinking itself it must incessantly contest its form and prevent it to settle into a shape completely of its own. This
path “can accordingly be regarded as the path of doubt, or, more properly, as the path of despair.” The aim of this self-accomplishing scepticism (sich vollbringende skeptizismus) isn’t in adjusting the cognitive apparatus to account for the truth, but it is rather “a conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge, for which the most real is in truth merely the unrealized concept.” This is addressed through a meticulous exploration of the relation of reason itself in the other, which is based on a premise of the Phenomenology of Spirit that science can be achieved only through self-knowledge of consciousness. Later, in the Encyclopedia, Hegel added:

Science should be preceded by universal doubt, i.e., by total presuppositionlessness. Strictly speaking, this requirement is fulfilled by the freedom that abstracts from everything, and grasps its own pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking—in the resolve of the will to think purely.

This minimal form of thinking, thinking that is implemented on itself, without any sensual supplement, strictly speaking overlaps with Hegel’s elevated concept of speculation, an activity of reason reflecting on itself. The difference being that the first expresses a process, while the latter defines its immateriality. Hegel inserts another subtle twist when he embraces Aristotle and posits that sleep is a passive nous, reason or spirit. The passive nous is thus a slumbering soul, capable of speculation but not knowing it. It is being speculated on without its own will, activity of reason on itself. As such, it represents the opposition to the active soul, which is constantly at work, but at the price that it needs constant affection not to fall asleep.

Even if Hegel was working from the premise that the subject can inhabit the position of science, he was simultaneously mesmerized by dreams. As already mentioned, after recounting the dreams, Hegel wrote: “I woke up. But it seemed difficult to me to have to go to class.” Dreams introduced a sort of uneasiness into the realm of knowledge, whereby the place where knowledge is (re)produced becomes traumatically signified. The reason is that dreams themselves produce a distinctive knowledge, indifferent to what we are left with in the waking state. One could simply add “in consequence of the dreamer’s wish,” as Freud was fond to do, before the explanation that Hegel puts forth. Freud attempted to bridge the difference that adheres in-between thoughts and dreams by reminding his readers “that a dream is as a rule merely a thought like any other, made possible by a relaxation of the censorship and by unconscious reinforcement, and distorted by the operation of the censorship and by unconscious revision.” Even here, there seem to be no certain marks to distinguish waking consciousness from dreaming, only a common denominator—thinking: an impossible coupling of thought and doubt, a premise of the cogito, a suture which nevertheless has to be made, as a speculative task.

The differentiating factor which constitutes the act of awakening from sleep is ultimately the hiatus or discrepancy within the dream narrative. It has everything to do with thinking and consciousness: there is namely a rational kernel embed-
ded in both. If we quickly come back to Hegel’s dream, surely it was caused by the Niethammer’s letter, however the traumatic part, which led him to doubt his own knowledge, was the moment that knowledge itself was exhausted in his dreams. The latter functioned as Vorstellungrepräsentanz, a sort of a repetition or a substitute of the representation. His dream revolved around the expression of knowledge and it was at the moment when the material of his waking life was repeated, when the meaninglessness of knowledge was presented, that doubt came to the surface and ejected Hegel from his dream. This becomes even clearer if we follow Freud in the reasoning that a dream wakes us up at the very moment when we might touch the truth. Such dreams are often associated with anxiety, as Hegel’s example clearly shows, which are introduced as a last effort to mask the wish present in the dreams. The dreamer will thus miss the satisfaction in remembering only anxiety. We can offer an interpretation according to which the potential of the aforementioned passive nous comes to the surface and produces a sort of unbalancing (he doubted, but didn’t know it). Hegel’s dream supports this claim. Just before the point when knowledge collapses on itself, he suddenly wakes up, so he could dream on and thus allow knowledge to remain unscathed.

With this in mind, let’s not forget that our prevailing question still remains unanswered, the point of Kant’s dream. There was obviously quite a lot of meat to Hegel’s dream, whereas the latter one seems to consist just of skin and bones. Be that as it may, there is nevertheless some fine tissue holding both together. Initially, it appears that there is little evidence available to decipher anything more than what Kant already enunciated regarding his dream. Nothing seems to be hidden behind Hume’s presence, but his theory of causation based on the notion of habit. In The Conflict of Faculties, we can find a suitable Kantian answer to this mystery: “that one who has given too much of his adult life, specifically more than one-third of it, to sleep cannot expect a long time for sleeping, that is, for living and growing old.” Hegel may be able to provide a sufficient answer to the status of the underbelly of dreaming, however it seems that the specifics of the initially presented ontological dream evaded him. It may even be luring to grasp at the elaborate and manifest content, however the proper response would be to emulate Columbo and ask one more question. Specifically, the question pertaining to dogma, the state from which Kant and the modern era awoke. Instead of inserting an obvious explanation, according to which the dogmatic slumber was clearly a reflection of his specific period, a vague question, one which touches upon something unexpected and unpredictable produces a more productive answer.

So, what exactly is in a dogma? Dogma comes from Greek opinion and tenet. It is further connected to dokein—to seem—and in Latin—belief. However, it is in general applied to religious doctrines that are accepted irrespective of reason or evidence, and justified by an authority. They usually carry a pejorative denotation, as they presuppose beliefs without the use of reason. But these familiar definitions often omit its universal character as they have to be "communicated uncorrupted to all human beings for all future times [...] entrusted to the care of the learned.”
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Contrary to such partial explanations, Hegel sees in the emergence of dogma an immanent process of thought, or strictly said, the theoretical part of truth. Dogmas are meant to be practiced, which also encompasses the insistence on discipline, a fidelity to the word, whereby we blindly follow rules, but it is only in this manner that a speculative form can manifest itself. Therefore, it is the essential part of the modern world not a remainder of the old. Dogma is thus a theoretical proposition which is valid in itself (objectively). Even when used in the general sense that the ancient Sceptics gave to “dogmatism,” it constitutes nothing else but a set of definite theses. But we come closer to the truth by looking at its narrower sense, an interpretation attributed to Kant. A dogma is thus a proposition that obliges us to necessarily choose between two contradictory principles: for instance, either the world is infinite or finite, but not both.

On the one side, it is curious that Kant was thrilled to wake up from the dream of theoretical dogmatic coherence into the dreary landscape of transcendental idealism. Even though in principle, the immersion into thought seemed as a foreordained decision, there was a stronger motive opposing it, an aspiration to step behind the back of reason and observe its innards. Such a development is in line with Hegel’s reflection that dreams must be overcome, speculated away, if we want to acquire true knowledge. On the other side, we already stressed that dreams are not just the guardians of sleep, but also the fulfilment of the wish. If it is possible to unveil an immanent interpretation of the slumber, this is the kernel where it can be illustrated. In being asserted, a dream isn’t expressing a wish or its realization, but exhibits a fulfilled wish: the wish and its realization actually overlap. In this sense, Hegel’s other claim that dreams suspend the inner differentiation of consciousness to itself holds up, however the question, how is the same dream able to induce a cognizant state, remains unanswered. Since Kant’s initial wager rested on the dream’s ability to force a transformation of the structure of thinking, the transition from one state to the other isn’t merely a technical detail, but a cornerstone that facilitates the capacity to think.

If we accept that the dream material is embedded into the structure of desire (wish), it seems impossible to rationalize the occurrence of waking up as anything else but a response to an arbitrary somatic affect or psychic impulse. However, before making any hasty conclusions, it is preferable to briefly consult the father of dream theory and examine his *The Interpretation of Dreams*. More precisely, a dream of a father whose recently deceased child walks to his bed in flames and scoldingly asks him: “Father, can’t you see that I am burning?” Shortly after, the father wakes up beside his dead child’s burning cloth. The classical explanation is well known: smelling the smoke, the father integrated the scenario into his dreams and prolonged his sleep. While such standardized interpretations are based on the premise that dreams are produced to enable the dreamer to remain in the state of dreaming even when disturbed by external stimulus such as noise, this dream seems to undermine such a notion. In this instance, it wasn’t the stimulus that woke him up, but the dream itself, which was supposed to prolong his sleep. The sentence in the
dream manifested a traumatic kernel, a message that held more reality than the
impetus from his burning child’s body. The father’s leap from the dream wasn’t a
rescue mission to save his child, but an escape from the dream. You can give up on
your dreams, but never give up on your nightmares. Clearly the question of waking
cannot be formulated through the opposition between the external and internal
counters with the real. Rather, in the same manner that for Hegel the organizing
principle of the spirit is spirit itself, here, the dream is the conveyer of its own (un)
doing. Such instances aren’t structured as a declaration of affinity to being or non-
being, but are nevertheless expressed as their convergence.

Interestingly enough, Kant mentions a similar description in a letter to Garver,
when recounting the manner in which his dogmatic slumber was interrupted by a
dream.

It was not the investigation of the existence of God, immortality, and so on,
but rather the antinomy of pure reason—“The world has a beginning; it has
no beginning, and so on, right up to the 4th[sic]: There is freedom in man,
—versus: there is no freedom, only the necessity of nature”; that is what
first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of
reason itself, in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of
reason with itself.38

This idea didn’t simply interrupt a peaceful metaphysical nap, but inaugurated a
distinctive structural break. A completely distinct philosophical position emerged,
devoid of traditional metaphysical disputes, which attempted to ensure the truth-
fulness of their particular claims, as it was based on the failure to provide them at
all. By following the premise that reason (striving to establish an unconditioned
system) comes into contradiction with itself (failing because the process of under-
standing is always conditioned), Kant thus affirmed contradiction as its founda-
tion.39 The question posed to him in his dream was premised on a general result of
a discrepancy contained in metaphysical disputes of that time which exceeded the
limits of possible knowledge.

With this in mind, let us return to the initial conundrum introduced by Hume’s
spectral presence in Kant’s slumber. The philosophical slumber certainly prevented
a clear inquiry into the groundwork of the world on which it was resting. But that
changed with the emergence of antinomy out of this calmness that came to promi-
nence through the question of disjointed causality, the forefront of Hume’s inquiry
into its necessity. For him, there is no universal law governing the world, only
simple successiveness based on experience. Nothing more. And yet, Kant detected
an additional aspect:

I thus first tried whether Hume’s objection might not be represented gener-
ally, and I soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect
is far from being the only one by which the understanding thinks connec-
tions of things a priori; rather, metaphysics consists wholly and completely
of them. I sought to secure their number, and since this succeeded as de-
sired, namely, from a single principle, I then proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, on the basis of which I was now assured that they are not derived from experience, as Hume had feared, but had arisen from the pure understanding.40

Taking Hume’s wager that there is a sort of bond knitted between (empirical) natural and (logical) representational laws, Kant follows his steps and derives the first from the latter while furthermore conditioning their relation with unconditioned (pure) thought. Necessity is thus a feature of the mind or the spirit,41 but is still inherently tied to the sensual dimension. If there is a contradiction to be found in such reasoning, it is certainly here. By dogmatically claiming that there is causality, while nevertheless asserting that it isn’t necessary as it is based on momentary impressions, Hume’s premise presents a structural discrepancy. Whereas the concept of causality can’t be purely (subjectively) determined it is still based on a pure (objective) notion of comprehensive determination. It was such an antinomy that drove Kant from the dogmatic slumber. The latter didn’t emanate from Hume’s idea (arbitrary linking cause and effect), but the incalculable part attached to it, the interval between empirical and logical domain. The specific impulse wasn’t solely entailed in the exhaustion of knowledge, as was the case in Hegel’s dreams, but the folding of the formal twofold logic that evoked an irreducible contradiction.

Even though there is a discrepancy present in dreams, we must not seek a reason to disprove its relevance, as it is here that we must formulate a coherent answer as to how the representational process is formed: it is the repressions, rejections, displacements and condensations that correspond to the contingency of a speaking being. And one can find a similar logic in pure understanding that cannot exclude its own inconsistencies, articulated as antinomies and paralogisms. Lacan, in contrast, specifies this discrepancy as the kernel of the real or more commonly known as jouissance, the intersection of pleasure and anxiety. If we place this function into the framework of dreaming, the representation falls through and hence the dream becomes unbearable (resulting in us waking-up). We dismissed outer influence as the predominant factor in shortening the dogmatic slumber, but desire and representation have a pivotal role. Although the spirit may triumph over the external world, there is an immanent impasse with its own conditions. Dreams, be they of a speculative variation or a dogmatic type, are a wish fulfilment: “Thus its content was the fulfilment of a wish and its motive was a wish.”42 The Humean dream namely has to be interpreted as a fulfilment of desires (the Other’s desire) to obtain knowledge, regardless of the consequences. Despite the impossible choice, Kant opted to stay faithful to such reasoning. And it seems that he only woke up, so he could dream further of speculative truths. In reality, Kant’s slumber wasn’t really successful in overcoming dogmatism as it was more in line with a well known story: As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams, he found himself transformed in his bed into an enormous vermin (ungeheure Ungeziefer).43 Hegel
would later add, we shouldn’t see weakness in this, but his greatest accomplish-
ment.

Notes

1. In a small footnote in The Interpretation of Dreams, we find a passage in which Freud
appears to assert precisely this division between the subject and his desire: "No doubt
a wish-fulfillment must bring pleasure; but the question then arises "To whom?" To the
person who has the wish, of course. But, as we know, a dreamer’s relation to his wishes
is a quite peculiar one. He repudiates them and censors them—he has no liking for them,
in short. So that their fulfillment will give him no pleasure, but just the opposite; and
experience shows that this opposite appears in the form of anxiety, a fact which has still
to be explained. Thus a dreamer in his relation to his dream-wishes can only be compared
to an amalgamation of two separate people who are linked by some important common
nian terms, a more modernized version which embraces specifics minutiae of the current
era, the wish fulfillment should be translated as “a desire of the Other,” a desire of the
symbolic order and not just a personal whim. In practice, this reinterpretation enables the
analyst to effortlessly inhabit the symbolic position of the Other.

2. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 678.


4. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

5. Sigmund Freud, Gesammelte werke I: Einige Nachträge zum Ganzen der Traumdeutung

6. This is not the only occasion that Hegel mentions the stimulating nature of dreams in
letters. The other example was of a dream that his wife had of her and his friend Nietham-
mer. Hegel was suspiciously not invited to this dream.

7. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1827-28) (Oxford:

303.

9. The argumentation was the following: “pigs most resemble human beings in their di-
gestive and other intestinal organs [...] while apes, on the contrary, for their drollery, have
human-like appearance, mannerisms, imitative ability, and so forth.” (Letters, 303).


Individuals with dementia aren’t worldless. They share a common humanity and rationality. They are able to engage the world and participate with others. A reliable method to achieve this, according to Hegel, is to set the subject to work: “To work means to become interested in a cause, to become interested in a cause outside of subjectivity.” (Hegel, Lectures, 120)

17. The theme of the omnipotence of thought is especially prevalent in Freud’s study Totem and Taboo (1913), where it is presented as the absence of a dividing line between imagination and reality. The boundary that usually governs the laws of the world are simply dismissed in favor of universal principle based on subjective postulates. Occurrences which would be categorized as accidental acquire a predominant meaning, or even more pronounced, a fleeting thought coincides with an actual event whereby the belief in its omnipotence becomes almost unavoidable. That is also the reason why we convince ourselves that we shouldn’t think about school grades or the victory of the home team before they happen, because the intrusion of thinking may change the outcome. All such examples have an uncanny undertone, because they embody the lost part of reality, thought itself, which becomes visible and assumes its form.

18. More consistently put, the pre-conscious state is a unaactualized consciousness.

21. "Our determination was that the individual existing for itself has excluded natural life from itself (the in-itself, the implicit being of individuality); it is in a state of opposition to slumbering natural life.” (Hegel, Lectures, 104)


35. In the long-running detective crime drama series Columbo, the title character appears oddly out of place as he seems to exist outside the coordinates of normal reality. While in a regular series the audience is supposed to get to know the protagonist by also witnessing his intervening personal life and intimate predicaments, Columbo excludes this familiarity and only leaves unreliable hints of it. Instead, it focuses exclusively on the characters explicit traits. Each of his mannerisms, the head scratching while thinking, the inappropriate cigar smoking, the outdated appearance and the awkward conversations are all structured as a slip or parapraxis, symptomatic actions and statements that point to unconscious impulses, intentions, implications and thoughts. Furthermore, his presence in the TV series is devoid of anything else but the drive to solve a perpetuated crime. Standing almost as a caricature of a detective, he only endures as a pure question to being.


37. Here it is interesting to refer to G.K. Chesterton, who regards dogma as one of two structural necessities of the human mind, the other being prejudice. If every thought is thus pervaded by a dogma, this theoretical foundation has to be disseminated to others for the dogma to remain coherent. This notion is best exemplified by the educational process: “A teacher who is not dogmatic is simply a teacher who is not teaching.” Gilbert Keith Chesterton, *The G.K. Chesterton Collection* (London: Catholic Way Publishing Company, 2014) 295. Can this logic also be revised to fit a dogmatic position? Certainly: a dogmatic who is not teaching is in fact not dogmatic.


39. Kant is clear about these circumstances from the very outset of his first critique: "Human reason has the peculiar fate in one type of its cognitions that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human reason." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 99. Of course, assigned with such an impossible task, man does not accept failure. “For human reason, without being moved by the mere vanity of knowing it all, inexorably pushes on, driven by its own need to such questions that cannot be answered by any experiential use of reason and of principles borrowed from such a use.” (Kant, *Critique*, 147) The crucial part that shouldn’t be overlooked is that the function of overreaching is essential for experience to exist: “If the use of higher abilities of understanding would be limited to what was directly given at the level of sensuality; if there was thus no function of reaching over itself, - then there would be no experience.” Zdravko Kobe, "Antinomičnost pri Kantu," *Problemi* 40.3-4 (2002): 145-187.

41. More specifically, it is the representational mechanisms of understanding (materialized through *a priori* concepts) that structures experience and the causal links within which it operates.


43. An *Ungeziefer* isn’t a specific insectoid animal, as usually depicted, but any animal unfit for sacrifice.