In the capitalist discourse, S (the subject) and S₂ (knowledge) constitute a couple in which each element is sundered [scindé], rather than split [divisé] from the other. I am using the term, “sundered,” as the name of a process in which the dialectic that occurs in splitting is absent. This sundering is the true subject of Robert Louis Stevenson’s extraordinary text, the *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*. This book appeared in 1886, three months after Marx’s death, and two years before the article on hysteria that Freud wrote for Villaret’s medical dictionary.

This narrative deserves to be considered a new myth because it is removed from the problematic of the double, which characterizes German “dark romanticism.” Just as Hyde is not Jekyll’s double, so Jekyll is also not Hyde’s double. These are two sundered entities, rather than a split subject.

It is true that Jekyll himself uses the word, “double” in the succinct notes that he keeps on the experiment in transformation. Yet there is a decisive reason not to rank Stevenson’s story within the prolix literature of the double produced during the nineteenth century: Hyde and Jekyll never encounter each other, for although they are sundered, they are also the same. They are both enclosed within the “fortress of identity,” as Stevenson says.

Naturally, Jekyll is situated in the place of S and Hyde in S₂. Jekyll is a doctor, a man of knowledge, like Faust. Yet Doctor Faust triumphs where Jekyll fails. If a diagnosis were required, one could say that Jekyll and Hyde are one schizophrenic. Yet what is important is that, during the very period when the process of constituting the individual could be considered to have been achieved and the metaphor of the organic social body to have become obsolete, Stevenson’s long story brought to light an individual sundered within himself, in the form quite exactly of a subject that has been cut from its unconscious: S // S₂.

This is one of the keys of this reading: Jekyll is Hyde’s foreclosed unconscious. In other words, Hyde should be considered as the hero, whose inability to know anything about his unconscious is the tragic weakness that constitutes the story’s motive force and novelty. The access to the unconscious has been radically closed because the barrier of jouissance has been lifted and the unconscious ends up go-
ing solo. If the unconscious, like Jekyll, is in S1, this means that, contrary to the received psychoanalytic idea that Hyde is Jekyll’s unconscious, it is Jekyll who is Hyde’s unconscious. Because Jekyll is the unconscious and the latter is, by virtue of the capitalist discourse, closed, Hyde is the drive, rather than the unconscious. Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are the emblematic figures of this “scission.” They could even become its eponym, if we keep the game of hide and seek in mind, since Hyde’s name is obviously a punning reference to this game.

Stevenson, who came from a family in which the men had traditionally been constructors or engineers of lighthouses, wrote this tale at the age of 36. The kernel of the story emerged in a nightmare that he had had a year before, from which his wife, Fanny, frightened by his screams had awakened him. He wrote a first narrative of this nightmare, which he then destroyed after a violent argument with her; she thought that it was a failure because it did not include any moral.

This tale has a precedent in Stevenson’s work: an early play entitled Deacon Brodie, or the Double Life, which was inspired by a real event: Brodie was a cabinet-maker by day and a burglar by night, as well, of course, as being a deacon whose task was to distribute alms. This already indicates that Stevenson is concerned more with questions of money than with neoromantic narratives of doubles. It may not be irrelevant to note both that his father was a rigorous and intransigent Calvinist and that, according to his own statements, he wrote his tale to pay “Byles the butcher.” It is also relevant that Stevenson was once struck by reading an article on the subconscious. All of these matters converge on an emphasis on the conflict between good and evil, but one in which the problems of money and the “subconscious” come into play in an entirely new way, the result is a new configuration that overwhelms the established ethical conceptions.

I have chosen the term, “scission” in order to accentuate the incompatibility between two entities, which belong, nevertheless, to a single personality. Entzweigung, the term that Freud uses in the article, “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence,” would have been appropriate if I were writing in German. “Two divide into one,” which reverses the formula by which Mao Zedong defined the dialectic, could also, in an ironic way, be appropriate. The term, “scission” has also been used to characterize the lacerating break within the psychoanalytic movement in 1953. This is a supplementary reason for my choice, since in this split, Lacan, by analogy, would, of course, be Mr. Hyde (the drive) and the Paris Psychoanalytical Society would just as incontestably be the unconscious. Let us hope that this institute will not lead Lacan to commit suicide—which, in my little analogy, would involve his transformation into something like the I.P.A.—which would not be impossible, if such a transformation involves the petrification of theory.

Do contemporary myths exist, or must we resign ourselves these days to dealing only with ideologies? I am tempted to maintain that myth remains relevant, and perhaps we would be better off to replace sociology (or to regenerate it) with an ethnography of our own societies, which may well be civilized, but which are
nonetheless prehistoric, since writing still does not have its true place in them. It was compromised by the sacralization that it first inspired, and now by an inflation of publications, which bears a strong resemblance to what is referred to, in finance, as a money-printing frenzy.

As the very perceptive critic, Jean-Pierre Naugrette, notes in his preface to a French translation of Stevenson's story, there is, however, a limit to this splitting: except on one occasion, Hyde never says “I.” For this reason, he can never become the radically immoral narrator of the tale. The final chapter is entitled, “Henry Jekyll’s Full Statement of the Case” (with its equivocal use of the term, “case,” which can refer to both a police investigation and a clinical case). Jekyll has thus not, at this point, lost the capacity to speak. The loss of his subjectivity will eventually reach the point where he can no longer say “I,” and where Hyde will take over from him. This may be the story’s sole resemblance to the problematic of the double, but this also may not be a correct assessment. It would be better to ask what the status of this “I” is in analytic experience. A narration of a dream often begins with “I,” but we know that the action reported by this “I” also conceals the actual place of desire; this desire is figured, instead, in the third person, in another of the dream’s entities. Thus we can ask whether awakening from a dream doesn’t have a particular function: to prevent what arises from “pure evil”—from Thanatos—from becoming interwoven with the other aspects of desire. This is, of course, true, yet does this mean that there could be a satisfying dream—from which one would not wake up—or at least, a dream that would not have to be interrupted by an awakening? Wouldn’t such a dream be one in which Thanatos and its libidinal linkage with the dream have been hidden successfully? This would correspond to what Stevenson’s tale does: Thanatos is disentangled from the rest, for Mr. Hyde is forbidden from saying “I.” In other words, saying “I” is a minimal libidinalization of the pure culture of death.

These are the sorts of questions raised by the story of Henry Jekyll, an honorable physician and scientist, who is transformed by a drug into the cruel Mr. Hyde. The latter, after trampling a girl in the street, kills a member of parliament, Sir Danvers Carew, for no reason. Jekyll decides to stop this experiment, but the transformations continue and he can no longer control them. In order not to become and remain Hyde, he commits suicide.

From the Door to the Window

In this story, the choice of various last names involves a certain “predestination” in Stevenson’s treatment of his characters. This is obvious with “Hyde,” but is also the case with “Utterson,” the utter, perfect son, who is also an utter idiot. He is an “incurable” son: one who cannot make himself an exception to the Oedipus complex, whether the latter be positive or negative. Such a son would fundamentally be a sinner, even without killing his father. Utterson thus contrasts with Markheim, the main character of another story by Stevenson. The latter does not believe that he
can be reduced to his criminal act, and wants only to be judged from within himself. Externally, he is determined by his act, but remains free "within"; this, according to Markheim, is what counts in God's eyes. He is his father's son, but this predicate misses his being. For this reason, he refuses the pact that the devil proposes to make with him. 7 There is another difference between "Markheim" and the Strange Case. Whereas in the former, the hero resists the devil, or at least the tempter, Hyde is constantly mentioned as a possible figure of the devil; this suggests, as soon as we learn that Hyde is Jekyll, that the devil is not an external character, but is the part of each of us that involves the drives. If we go a step further, we will reach Freud's thesis that the devil is the equivalent of the father: a representation of the father whom it is possible to hate.

We can now return to Utterson, the strange lawyer who, in apparent contrast with his well-ordered and disciplined life, "inclines to Cain's heresy," by "letting my brother go to the devil in his own way" (2). 9 His ability to forgive anything makes him an ideal father, which is the fate of a son who is imprisoned for life in the Oedipus complex. In the first part of the story, as investigator, he wants to know who Hyde is: "If he be Mr. Hyde...I shall be Mr. Seek" (21). Yet he starts off by following a false, rather vague lead, which is not exactly the one that was given to him by Richard Enfield, the friend who had witnessed Hyde's trampling of the little girl. Enfield had mentioned the possibility that Mr. Hyde was blackmailing Dr. Jekyll, but Utterson fixates on a somewhat different idea: that Jekyll is concealing an old wrongdoing, which would explain the mysterious will in which he has made Hyde his heir, just as it would explain why Hyde is in possession of Jekyll's signed checks. Utterson, after seeing his friend and trying in vain to convince him to change the will in favor of Hyde, ends up in consenting to a request of Jekyll's: that he help Hyde after he himself is dead.

Both these events and those that follow raise a question concerning the reader. As the story progresses, there are numerous clues that Jekyll is indeed Hyde. Unfortunately, it is difficult it specify at what moment(s) the reader(s) would solve the mystery, since most readers are now aware of the solution from the beginning. It is unlikely, however, that even an entirely innocent reader would not be a few steps ahead of Utterson, who is unequal in his capacity to be duped. While awaiting the revelation, the facts emerge gradually, before being placed in logical order by Jekyll's final confession. Yet the question remains, the importance of which can be emphasized by returning to the question of psychosis: at what point is it possible to know that Jekyll is Hyde, and thus to foil both that paranoiac innocence so admirably stowed away in the jewelry box of authenticity that typifies paranoid manners, and also the fierce ignorance of the schizophrenic.

A year after Jekyll's request to Utterson, a crime occurs: it is the repetition, in an aggravated form, of the inaugural scene, in which Hyde trampled the little girl. In this second scene, the victim, who does not survive, is a member of parliament, Sir Danvers Carew, who is "trampl[ed]...under foot," a feature that, because of its repetition, leads me to believe that it had figured in Stevenson's nightmare (37). In
scene I, the witness is Utterson’s friend, Enfield. In scene II, the witness is a maid with “romanti[c]” tendencies, whose master was being visited by Hyde (35). A letter for Utterson is found on the corpse, thus confirming that the former is the key character, with whom all the others are connected. This is an important point: Utterson is the ultimate receiver of all the numerous letters in the story, even of those that are not initially addressed to him. This letter is the only one whose content we never discover. It has the status of an exception, and it constitutes a point of incompleteness in the story, like the hand of one of the Meninas in Velázquez’s painting. Let us also note, because it confirms that this text is not part of the romantic tradition, the narrative’s astonishing modernity. The action involves objects that could be so many clues to help us discover the truth, but which must await the correct interpretation: an example is the cane, which is not only the murderer’s weapon, but is also a present given by Utterson to Jekyll. The same could be said for the butt of the checkbook, which had escaped being destroyed by fire in the chimney of Hyde’s apartment, and which is in Hyde’s name.

Because of this clue, the police inspector and Utterson wait for Hyde at the bank where he has his account, but he never comes. Then Utterson visits Dr. Jekyll, who claims that he no longer has any relation with Hyde. He shows Utterson a letter supposedly written by Hyde (letter 2), in which he assures Jekyll that he has a way to keep from getting caught. Utterson is reassured, but after asking Poole, Jekyll’s servant, what the messenger looked like, he learns that there had been no messenger. Returning, worried again, to his home, he shows the letter to Mr. Guest, his head clerk, who also happens to be an expert graphologist, and asks him his opinion about the “murderer’s autograph” (51). After examining the paper, Guest says that the writer is “not mad; but it is an odd hand” (51). When a servant enters, carrying a letter (letter 3)—an invitation from Dr. Jekyll—Guest recognizes the handwriting and asks Utterson for permission to compare Hyde’s letter with Jekyll’s note, concluding that “the two hands are in many points identical: only differently sloped” (52). Later, when alone, Utterson thinks to himself, “What!…Henry Jekyll forge for a murderer!” (52). This episode is interesting because it raises the question of whether Jekyll knew what he was doing in forging a letter. The answer revises this question; the “forgery” is real. A better question would: who wrote it, Jekyll or Hyde? If Hyde wrote it, he did so not to deceive Jekyll, but to enable Jekyll to deceive Utterson. If Jekyll wrote it, it would still have the same goal. The ruse is the same whoever wrote it.

Thousands of pounds are offered for Hyde’s capture, to no avail. Jekyll becomes himself again and renews his relations with his friends. However, Utterson twice finds his friend’s door closed to everyone, and worried once again, pays a visit to Lanyon, with whom he had dined at Jekyll’s home a few evenings before. He finds Lanyon dying, and the latter, knowing that he has so little time left, confides in him: “I sometimes think that if we knew all, we should be more glad to get away” (57). Retroactively, we can, of course, explain why Lanyon makes this statement, but upon reading it for the first time, it is enigmatic. Lanyon also tells Utterson that he
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has broken entirely with Jekyll. Troubled, Utterson returns home, writes to Jekyll to ask him why he is not receiving and why he has quarreled with Lanyon. Jekyll answers (letter 4) without revealing anything, and only asking Utterson to “suffer me to go my own dark way” (58). Eight days later, Lanyon dies, leaving Utterson an envelope (letter 5) that contains another envelope (letter 6) marked as “not to be opened till the death or disappearance of Dr. Henry Jekyll” (60). Utterson is struck by the term, “disappearance,” which had already figured in the will that Jekyll had made in Hyde’s favor.

Utterson has stopped visiting Jekyll because of his friend’s taciturnity, but one evening, while on a walk with Enfield, he finds himself standing under Jekyll’s window. Encountering Jekyll, they begin to speak with him, and he seems happy to see them, but then suddenly “the smile was struck out of his face and succeeded by an expression of such abject terror and despair, as froze the very blood of the two gentlemen below” (64).

From then on, events move quickly. One evening, Jekyll’s servant, Poole, visits Utterson and begs him for help, since his master has shut himself up in his laboratory. On knocking on its door, they hear Jekyll say that he does not want to see anyone. Poole remarks to Utterson that Jekyll’s voice has changed, and that they are now hearing Mr. Hyde’s voice.

The Change of Voice

Within the anomalous matheme of the capitalist discourse, this voice can be located at $a$:

$$
\text{Hyde} \quad \downarrow \quad S \quad \times \quad \frac{S}{a} \quad \downarrow \quad \text{Dr. Jekyll}
$$

If $S$, knowledge, is Dr. Jekyll, and $S$, the subject, is Mr. Hyde, then in $S$, we can only place the author himself, Robert Louis Stevenson, the master of the mystery. The transformation of the voice would then concern two arrows: the one that descends from $S$ to $a$, and then the diagonal arrow that moves upward from $a$ to $S$. Voices are modulated by knowledge: how, for example, is it possible not to recognize the voice of a priest on a radio broadcast? Now, the consequence of the transformation of Jekyll’s voice into Hyde’s is to strip it of the knowledge that clothes it in order to make the strings of the drive, which had until then been concealed, begin to vibrate. Knowledge has one voice and the drive has a very different one, which betrays the subject. This reading may seem a bit forced, and since Lacan defines the object $a$ in this discourse as surplus-jouissance, one can wonder if it wouldn’t be more appropriate to say that money—and especially surplus-value—occupies the place of the production. This place could also be taken by the numerous consumer objects, which are supposed to saturate the subject’s desire, although they seek to
do so in vain, since the subject never ceases to be split. This structural requisite will form the center of the denouement of the “strange case.” I shall soon confirm these hypotheses.

Despite these considerations, there is another reason to emphasize the voice as object. Doesn’t the variation in the voice invite us to locate not only Hyde, but also Utterson, in S? Perhaps, at the end, Utterson, the utter son, is also found here, in a way that resolves the enigma of how two are divided into one. Indeed, it is Utterson who will be substituted for Hyde in Jekyll’s will, a substitution that has never received the emphasis that it deserves.

In the denouement, Poole reveals a second episode to Utterson, giving him a note (letter 7) in which Jekyll complaints to his apothecary that a particular powder did not have the same composition as the one that he had bought earlier. (It will turn out that the first powder was impure and that this very impurity had probably enabled it to turn Hyde back into Jekyll.) Then Poole tells Utterson that he had once seen his master disguised, as if he were wearing a mask on his face. After having once again produced an incorrect explanation, Utterson finally decides to intervene, as Poole had asked him to. They break down the laboratory door, and find the corpse of Hyde, who has swallowed cyanide.

This time, the reader will certainly have seen further than Utterson, who is still looking for Dr. Jekyll, even after finding Hyde’s body. Utterson’s time is always, structurally, late. He does not know how to read the clues that he continues to discover, even when he finds in the laboratory a religious book, which is annotated in Jekyll’s own hand with “startling blasphemies” (86). Finally, on the table, Utterson finds three documents: Jekyll’s will, in which he is designated as heir in Hyde’s place; a letter (letter 9) in which Jekyll enjoins him to read the document that Lanyon had sent to him; and finally, Jekyll’s confession (letter 10). The solution to the mystery finally appears in these two last documents.

These two documents bring to an end the story, along with its enigmas and lacunas, its holes in the narrative tissue, its red herrings and the pseudo-explanations produced systematically by Utterson. The action finishes. Lanyon and Jekyll are dead. With the unveiling of what had been hidden, one returns to the present in order to go back over the course of events, the coherence of which is now guaranteed by the revelation of the secret that had made them incomprehensible.

The Devil or Science

There is a reason why the two final texts were written by two doctors, the custodians of knowledge, who were rivals in the field of science, or rather, disagreed about its powers. One, Lanyon, was a humanistic positivist, while the other wanted to enable human beings to become the equals of their creator, to borrow the terminology that was used in the second half of the nineteenth century. This theme marks
a turning point. In dark romanticism, people turned towards their doubles or their shadows, and the consistency taken on by the latter was credited to the devil; it was with the devil that one could make a pact—at the price of being bound by it—that would permit access to a jouissance that was inaccessible by other means. I have already mentioned that Goethe was an exception to this scheme, because he subverted the notion of the pact by making Faust the victor and Mephisto the vanquished. In this respect, Jekyll is more modern than Lanyon, just as Doctor Moreau is more modern than Brigitte Bardot, because they prefigure the biological manipulation that seeks to preserve the animality of the human, rather than to imagine the humanity of the animal. Nevertheless, the gap between Lanyon and Jekyll cannot be more slender. The most blinkered positivism can be compatible with the most credulous spiritualism, but this is not what is really at stake: neither Lanyon nor Jekyll is tempted by spiritualism, and they are hardly responsible for the return of astrology under capitalism. Instead, the question is a fundamental one: that of the limit of science. Does science have a place in the field of jouissance? What is in question is not sexology, which is always stupid and fraudulent, but the intertwinning and the disentwining of the drives, of Eros and Thanatos.

The two final documents, Jekyll’s statement in particular, throw an interesting light on this problem. Before examining them, however, I would like to point out an interesting discrepancy in Lanyon’s letter concerning the date of the letter in which Jekyll had appealed to him to follow his bizarre instructions (which were supposed to enable Jekyll, who had been transformed unexpectedly into Hyde while far from home, to procure the drugs necessary to recover his original identity). The date of this letter is 10 December 18… In his confession, however, Jekyll situates this episode on a “fine, clear, January day” (131). Perhaps this contradiction results merely from an oversight on Stevenson’s part. Yet even if there is some confusion, why not raise it to the level of a symptom, and consider it as the final mark, in the real, of the impossibility of grasping simultaneity? One person’s time is never the same as another’s, and even if physics can measure both, it cannot situate them on the same continuum, since the space in which they take place is never the same.

More importantly, what is new about Lanyon’s narrative is his encounter with Hyde, and his shock at seeing Hyde being transformed into Jekyll. Lanyon tells Utterson about the effect produced by Hyde’s presence: an “odd subjective disturbance [was] caused by his neighbourhood. This bore some resemblance to incipient rigor, and was accompanied by a marked sinking of the pulse” (99). Lanyon makes it clear that this effect is not the result of a feeling of hatred. Certainly Hyde, as other witnesses have attested, inspires, and even catalyzes hatred. Yet Lanyon is testifying to something else. Perhaps what Lanyon discovers in this unalterable alterity is the human being as such.

The effect of Jekyll’s reappearance is less shocking, although just as cataclysmic: “My life,” says Lanyon, “is shaken to its roots” (105). The horror of discovering Jekyll’s “moral turpitude” and that he is Carew’s murderer (note the affectionate use of the name, “Sir Danvers”) will push Lanyon to his death. Only ethics can evaluate
this situation, since morality, as Dr. Lanyon’s death proves, does not provide a sufficient rampart against this discovery.\(^{10}\)

Let us now enter the central part of Stevenson’s edifice: Jekyll’s own narrative, his “statement of the case,” before Utterson as judge. Jekyll’s rather commonplace biography can be summarized in terms of the conflict between duplicity and sincerity, or, to be more precise, objective duplicity and subjective sincerity. Closer to the heart of the ethical question, we find the thesis that “man is not truly one, but truly two” (108). Perhaps, he wonders, the “fortress of identity” exists only to contain this primal sundering and can be undone, by orienting one’s scientific studies “towards the mystic and the transcendental” (111, 107). Beyond this, Jekyll does not exclude the idea that people can be multiple; Stevenson himself kept abreast of the work of psychologists and physicians, who were using an experimental model involving hypnosis, on multiple personalities. The story, however, leaves the question of dualism or pluralism in suspense, and we could only take it up by examining the work of Deleuze and Guattari.\(^{11}\)

In the case of Jekyll, however, only two entities are confronted with each other: good and evil. These “polar twins” are not divided up in Jekyll and Hyde \textit{partes extra partes}. Although Hyde is indeed presented as pure evil, Jekyll remains divided between the two. If this had not been the case, Jekyll would not have been tempted to become Hyde. On the one hand, isolating evil, transferring it into Hyde, exonerates Jekyll from his guilt:

\begin{quote}
the unjust might go his way, delivered from the aspirations and remorse of his more upright twin; and the just could walk steadfastly and securely on his upward path, doing the good things in which he found his pleasure, and no longer exposed to disgrace and penitence by the hands of this extraneous evil (109).
\end{quote}

One can only be struck by this prefiguration of the modern, even postmodern subject; nearly half a century later, the character of Pierpont Mauler in Bertolt Brecht’s \textit{Saint Joan of the Stockyards} would follow this configuration to an astonishing degree.\(^{12}\) Yet it should also not be forgotten that what can be criticized for its conformity to the capitalist discourse was originally a rejection of the doctrine of original sin; seen in these terms, the conclusion would not be so unilateral, for this ideal goes well beyond its possible instrumentalization by capitalism. The other thing to be noted is that Stevenson, in relation to his conception of Jekyll’s transformation into Hyde (evil is physically smaller), has an intuition about the immateriality of the body. To translate this intuition without forcing things, I shall quote the way that Lacan treats this question in \textit{"Radiophonie"}: “The first body [the body of the symbolic] creates the second by incorporating itself into it. This is where the incorporeal that remains to mark the first comes from, from the time after its incorporation.”\(^{11}\) This is why Hyde is called an “inorganic” creature, which does not contradict, but rather confirms his “love of life” (133, 139). This love is not an Eros
that has a biological essence, but is the result of an experimentation that had been wished-for and conducted by a human being.

This leads us to the heart of Jekyll’s practical reason. Whereas Hyde is supposed to be pure evil, Jekyll is a composite of good and evil. It is because he rejects this subjective division that he conceives and carries out the Hyde project, but without succeeding. Jekyll and Hyde are therefore not symmetrical, and we have reason to claim that the myth forged by Stevenson concerns the refusal of the subject’s division. The only way to get rid of the Hyde in him is to change himself entirely into Hyde or to kill himself. In the same way, *mutatis mutandis*, in *Saint Joan of the Stockyards*, Joan is supposed to be pure good, and Mauler is the division between good and evil. Thus it is not very surprising that Jekyll himself, as he says in his statement, had thought that he had made this discovery “under the empire of generous or pious aspirations,” which, according to him, would have enabled him to “come forth an angel instead of a fiend” (115). This may be an illusion, but it reveals the temptation to rid himself of the ethical question. In this sense, *scission is an orthopedic prosthesis that serves to screen off the subject’s division*. 

As I have mentioned, a gnawing preoccupation makes itself felt throughout the everyday life of this bizarre couple: the need for the money that would be necessary for Hyde’s survival should Jekyll disappear. At the beginning, there is the will that makes Hyde the heir, then the money demanded by the parents of the girl whom he had trampled, and the check to them taken from a checkbook in Hyde’s name (a checkbook that he will burn in order to efface any trace of it, but the butt of which is recovered intact in the ashes) and the fact that the police believe wrongly that they can catch him when he goes to the bank to take out some money, etc. There is no transferral of personalities without a transferral of money, for the latter, with the coming of the capitalist mode of production, has become not only the indispensable means of subsistence, but also the standard for measuring something’s value; Hyde’s “respectability” can only be guaranteed by Jekyll’s fortune. There is no subject without money, no $ without a. Money comes very precisely in the place of the loss of jouissance, which is sealed by the entry into language, which also sets up our requirement for jouissance. In *a*, I first situated the voice, as part-object. Yet the voice, as Stevenson says over and over, changes. Hyde’s voice is not Jekyll’s. This variability of the objects *a* is what makes them precarious and signals their inability to ensure surplus-jouissance; this surplus-jouissance, in the capitalist discourse—for an individual who has been *deprived* of his/her unconscious—is expected finally to be able to lift the bar that divides the subject. In the full-fledged capitalist discourse, this subject would be reduced to the status of zero, which is its status outside its constitutive division, since zero is its appropriate value, as soon as it is made a pure effect of language. Since, however, the subject cannot be reduced to its splitting, it is the capitalist discourse that is headed for a blowout. 

In the capitalist discourse, money substitutes itself for the part-objects, and thus becomes their general equivalent, to use Marx’s term; it thereby provides the invariability that is necessary in order for surplus-jouissance not to fail. This supposes,
of course, what is said by the very people who have contributed to this illusion: the abandonment of the real economy and the belief that money is conceived by parthenogenesis, which would shelter it from any devaluation.

In a certain sense, everything is decided when Jekyll can no longer control Hyde’s transformations into him and vice versa. Jekyll’s determination is deactivated. This occurs on that “fine, clear, January day” mentioned above; until then, Jekyll’s determination guaranteed the permanence of his identity (131). Hyde was merely his “creature,” even if the “creator” rejoiced in Hyde’s “moral” independence. In this new configuration, however, Jekyll’s panic is presented as the signal of a threatening depersonalization: the total loss of identity, which would involve a reconstitution of his identity in the form of Hyde. In this situation, what comes literally to save Jekyll is a memory: “that of my original character, one part remained to me: I could write my own hand; and once I had conceived that kindling spark, the way that I must follow became lighted up from end to end” (133).

As we recall, it was Guest, Utterson’s first clerk, who noticed that Jekyll and Hyde’s handwriting differed only in their slopes. Unlike the voice, writing cannot change; it can only, at a pinch, be forged. Writing is on one side, and the voice and money are on the other. To say it roughly, what saves Jekyll is what condemns the capitalist discourse. To make this formulation more absolute, I shall add that writing, as a resistance to virtualization, is nothing other than the symptom as such. There is no need to treat “writing” as a metaphor to move from handwriting to Stevenson’s status as writer. For the signature as such marks the presence of the proper Name, which has a geographical particularity that goes against the globalization of language; writing becomes the way to exit from the prison-house of language. As Nathalie Sarraute wrote, “Knock, knock, real, open up.”

Finally, on this basis, we can approach the most sensitive question: who dies when Jekyll commits suicide? Is it even a suicide, since the body of the person who has killed himself is not the same as the corpse that Utterson and Poole find? In his statement of the case, Jekyll insists on this: “He, I say—I cannot say, I” (134). He thus emphasizes that when he is Hyde, he can no longer appropriate himself subjectively by speaking in the first person. This, indeed is the usual, or more precisely necessary case, since the “I” of the enunciation never corresponds with that of the statement. Is Jekyll, however, telling the truth? The final proposition of this narrative is “I bring the life of that unhappy Henry Jekyll to an end” (141). Who, in this case, is “I,” since Jekyll is referred to in the third person? Isn’t it Hyde? Several lines above, Jekyll writes, “when I shall again and forever reindue that hated personality, I know how I shall sit shuddering and weeping in my chair” (141). In the sentence itself, isn’t a transferral of the “I” operating continually, and doesn’t the reader be-
come sensitive to the pathetic quality of Hyde as subject: the evil one who finally reaches his division, thanks to his own anxiety?

The Three Scenes

We have just examined the final enigma presented by the denouement, but we have not yet finished. In Dr. Jekyll’s statement of the case, there is something that we have not yet mentioned: a slight event that takes place while Hyde is going from the hotel to Dr. Lanyon’s home, where he hopes to find the drug that will turn him back into Jekyll: “Once a woman spoke to him, offering, I think, a box of lights. He smote her in the face, and she fled” (135).

This scene constitutes the third version of what we have referred to as the primal scene, and it is impossible not to think of Freud’s analysis of the forms of the fantasy in “A Child is Being Beaten.” In Stevenson’s tale, we would obtain the following:

Primal Scene (Scene I): a little girl is being beaten by Hyde, while a man is watching.

Scene II: a man is being beaten by Hyde, while a woman is watching.

Scene III: a woman is being beaten by Hyde, but who is watching?

Since this third scene had at least one witness—the one who reports it—we could say that Jekyll is watching. It happens that this witness is unsure of himself, and adds, concerning the matchbox, “I think.” It is as if, at the moment when this scene takes place, Jekyll has already been partially absorbed by Hyde’s personality and is the point of disappearing as a witness. Yet the final witness, the tale’s author, is Stevenson himself. We shall soon see how this hypothesis will be borne out.

In these three scenes, Hyde is regularly in the position of the agent: the agent of castration, to introduce Freud’s thesis, and the real father—who carries out the subject’s castration—to present Lacan’s in his seventeenth seminar, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis. This conclusion confirms, rather than contradicts, the argument that Hyde is a pure being of the drives. The fantasy, which is primarily sadistic, is located on Jekyll’s side, in either an unconscious or a conscious form, and the bare drive, stripped of the fantasy, is found on Hyde’s side. The murder of Sir Danvers Carew procures a sadistic jouissance for him (he “tast[ed] delight from every blow”), but the jouissance that Stevenson attributes to him is certainly the result of a confusion connected to the author’s own conception of the real father (127). The jouissance of the real father must remain definitively unknown, since the very definition of this figure carries the logical implication that the jouissance attributed to him is the subject’s own (see Stevenson’s nightmare). Yet despite this reservation, Hyde is very much the agent of castration, the one who is an exception to the phallic law, and indeed, he is exempt from the passion of hatred for the man he kills. He is the object, rather than the agent of hatred. This leads us to question the figure of
the father who is paired with Hyde: Utterson, who is decidedly a jack of all trades. He is a symbolic father, the one who conforms to the law in everything, and who, as a correlate, can explain everything, especially the sons' turpitudes. The perfect son, quite consistently, turns out to be the perfect father. I shall not even enter into Stevenson's apparently rather complex relations with his own father, who supported his son, but had rather settled opinions on the path that he should follow: the compromise between the careers of engineer and writer was to study law!

Jekyll refuses his division as subject and occupies the place of knowledge, delegating that of subject to Hyde. In doing so, Jekyll inscribes himself precisely in the capitalist discourse: his explicit hope is to disencumber himself of his relation to desire by constructing a relation in which the object-cause of desire would complete Hyde as subject. This completion would put an end to the subject's division, as well as to subjectivation itself. This subjectivation is to be found in the fact that Jekyll is never totally absent from Hyde. If he were, why would he want to become Jekyll again? The division of the subject is therefore what resists the capitalist discourse, what this discourse cannot tame. As for the solution that would lie in having Hyde become the one who commands, and who would thus incarnate the $S^1_1$—the master signifier rather than the subject $S$—Jekyll refuses this with horror. If this were to take place, it would mean accepting that Hyde is the agent of castration, which he does not want. Such an acceptance would, however, be the condition of a return from the capitalist discourse to that of the master; $S^1_1$ would be found again in the place of the agent, and $S$ in that of truth.

Through this return, the unconscious could reclaim its rights and a psychoanalysis could take place.

The last matter that Jekyll mentions is the possibility that Hyde will destroy his statement. Likewise, he notes that in setting down his pen, he puts an end to the life of Dr. Henry Jekyll. What is a tale, if not the duration of its reading, during which the characters are alive? Can Hyde, in the fiction, exit from the fiction in which he was born, in order to prevent Jekyll from living in this fiction, and in consequence, deprive Stevenson of the status of being the author, and us of reading this masterpiece? To whom is Stevenson alluding, in this highly discreet, shadowy passage, if not to Fanny Osbourne, who, at an early moment, had suggested that the immoral first version of the *Strange Case* should be destroyed. Who better than his beloved cousin, Katherine de Mattos, could be the dedicatee of this first verse: "It's ill to loose the bands that God decreed to bind"?

2. [The term, "division," sometimes translated as "division" and sometimes as "splitting," plays an important role in this article. As the author notes, it is related to Freud’s use of the term, "Spaltung," which is translated as "splitting," in his late article, "The Splitting of the Ego in the Processes of Defence," Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-1974), XXI (1964). Pierre Bruno’s use of this concept is closely related to Lacan’s arguments in *L’acte psychanalytique* [The Psychoanalytic Act], the (unpublished) seminar that was interrupted by the outbreak of the events of May 1968. Bruno argues that this seminar enables us to distinguish between “castration” and “division”: to do so would involve differentiating between “lack (which opens up the possibility of not lacking) and loss (which is irreversible) and especially between the negativization of the phallus (\(-\phi\)) on the one hand and the barred subject, S, on the other. The latter implies the production of an object—the object a—that has no representation (which, as a result, situates it radically outside any representation in language). The end of an analysis lies in accepting this division and mourning for one’s castration, inasmuch as the latter...preserves the possibility of filling in lack (by sex, money, power).” See Bruno, 57–58. In this article, Bruno argues that this rejection of division in the capitalist discourse takes a particular form: the establishment and maintenance of as radical a distinction as possible between subject and knowledge. In order to name this operation, he confers a new meaning on the French verb, "scinder," the meaning of which is usually more or less synonymous with "diviser." To translate this term, I have chosen the English verb, "to sunder." (Translator’s note)]


7. The modes by which the subject can relate to the devil would be worth investigating. Faust, the most eminent among them, signs a pact but succeeds in outwitting the devil. If we admit that Toussaint Turelure—a character in Paul Claudel’s trilogy, which Lacan discusses at length in his seminar on transference—serves as a figure of the devil, then Sygne de Coûfontaine makes a "pact" for which she would receive nothing in return; then, at the end of her life, she refuses the new pact that would distort the meaning of the first one. Christophe Haizmann, the painter whose story Freud reconstitutes in "A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis," *invents* a pact as an alibi for his inability to do without a nurturing, and perhaps even "nourishing" father. Such ethical choices, and they are not the only ones, mark out for us three major aspects of the subjectivity of our age. In the case of "Markheim," whether the figure involved is indeed the devil remains uncertain. The character who proposes the pact is, instead, the incarnation of temptation.
8. In this respect, Utterson resembles Sacher-Masoch, who was also a "Cainite."


10. The gap between morality and ethics is a constant in Stevenson. In "Markheim," the hero is a criminal in the world and pure in God. See Robert Louis Stevenson, "Markheim," in *The Merry Men and Other Tales and Fables* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1887).

11. [See Bruno, 117–137 (Translator’s note).]

12. [See Bruno, 85–97 (Translator’s note).]


14. [See Bruno, 85–87 (Translator’s note).]

15. The capitalist discourse "works like a charm, like skids that have been fully greased, but that’s just it: it goes too fast, it consumes itself [ça se consomme], and it does so so well that it uses itself up [ça se consume]." Jacques Lacan, "Du discours psychanalytique," in *Lacan in Italia 1953 - 1978* (Milan: La Salamandra, 1978) 48.
